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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the impatience implications of continuous intertemporal re-
lations that verify monotonicity properties but do not necessarily verify the completeness
axiom. The impatience axiom manifests itself in the traditional present discounted utility
criteria. Authors like Koopmans (1960) or Diamond (1965) soon showed that under some
common assumptions, attractive principles like Strong Pareto come at the cost of a prefer-
ence for advancing the timing of future satisfactions. Further studies contributed to clarify
some basic facts about the impatience implications of Pareto axioms in the presence of
either continuities or representability, cf., Burness (1973), Svensson (1980), Shinotsuka
(1998), Banerjee and Mitra (2007), or Banerjee and Dubey (2013) among others. In the
seminal Koopmans (1960), “if we accept the Pareto axiom, it is the postulate of a utility
function that creates the mathematical difficulty that equal treatment of all generations is
not possible”: Banerjee and Mitra (2007, p. 237). Svensson (1980, Section 1) claims that
“in Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965) ‘impatience’ was a consequence of the mono-
tonicity and the continuity of an ordering”. According to Shinotsuka (1998): “continuity
of a preference relation in an infinite horizon setting implies some form of impatience or
myopia. Diamond (1965) was one of the earliest to formalize this idea”. Many forms of
impatience are ruled out when anonymity axiom is present. These axioms embody inter-
generational equity by imposing the equal treatment of the generations. Here we consider
patience implications of the common Diamond’s (weak) anonymity axiom.1
Suppose that we are interested in representable intertemporal preferences that verify
the strongest form of the Pareto axiom. Then, not only they must contradict anonymity in
extremely reduced program spaces (cf., Basu and Mitra (2003)), but also they must show
impatience at uncountably many infinite streams (Banerjee and Mitra (2007, Theorem
1)), and similar conclusions are valid when monotonicity is relaxed to Weak Pareto in
broader domains (Banerjee and Dubey (2013, Theorem 1)). See also Alcantud (2012,
2013); Alcantud and Garcı́a-Sanz (2013).
Suppose now the case of continuous intertemporal relations that verify the strongest
form of the Pareto axiom, and let us consider the impatience consequences of referring
continuity to the five topologies in Lauwers (1997)’ analysis. Concerning possible vi-
olations of anonymity, the following facts provide a quite complete analysis. Diamond
(1965) shows that continuity with respect to the Sup topology contradicts anonymity, thus
the same is true for the product and the myopic topologies, which are coarser. Campbell
(1985, Theorem 5) assures that lower semicontinuity with respect to the Campbell (there-
fore the product) topology contradicts anonymity. However, Svensson (1980) proves that
1Authors like Lauwers (1998) contribute to the analysis of extended versions of that principle that exclude
more generic forms of impatience.
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there exist complete preorders –or social welfare orders– that are Strongly Paretian, anony-
mous, and continuous with respect to Svensson’s topology. In this paper we investigate the
impatience implications that result from these assumptions when the completeness axiom
is dropped.
We define two versions of the usual no-impatience conditions that are successive weak-
enings of the anonymity axiom. They coincide for social welfare orders, although in gen-
eral the two conditions are different. In Section 3 we prove that they have different impli-
cations too. We show that the weakest version (NIw) is compatible with the existence of
Richter-Peleg representations that satisfy Strong Pareto, and that this is not the case of the
other version (NIs), for very general forms of the program space. We observe a sharp con-
trast with Banerjee and Dubey (2010), who prove that there do not exist Strongly Paretian
and anonymous intertemporal relations that have Richter-Peleg representations, respec-
tively multi-utility representations with their set of utilities being countably infinite. More
importantly, to prove that result we explicitly2 produce Strongly Paretian intertemporal
relations, continuous in the product topology, that verify NIw and that have multi-utility
representations continuous in the product topology, their set of utilities being countably
infinite. In particular this means than when we drop the completeness axiom, a certain
form of no-impatience is fully compatible with Strongly Paretian relations that are contin-
uous in any of the aforementioned topologies, since the product topology is coarser than
the Campbell, myopic, sup, or Svensson topologies. We also emphasize the contrast of
our explicit construction with Banerjee and Dubey (2014, Theorem 2), which states that
the existence of a social welfare order satisfying a relaxed form of Strong Pareto and no-
impatience involves non-constructive techniques. Again, when we drop the completeness
axiom a certain form of no-impatience leads to a different conclusion even if the full force
of the Pareto axiom is invoked.
In Section 4 we concentrate on the more restrictive no-impatience (NIs) property, for
which the conclusions are surprisingly different than in the case of the weaker version
(NIw). Except for the case of the Svensson topology, we have a widespread incompati-
bility: when the Weak Pareto axiom is imposed on an intertemporal relation, lower semi-
continuity in either the sup or the Campbell topology yields violations of no-impatience in
the sense of NIs. This imposes the impossibility of representing such relations by multi-
utility representations that are lower semi-continuous in these topologies. However the
2Recent literature contains several contributions on the subject of explicit description of social welfare
orders satisfying useful properties, following a conjecture by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) that there exists
no explicit description (that is, avoiding the axiom of choice or similar contrivances) of an ordering which
satisfies the Anonymity and Weak Pareto axioms. Lauwers (2010) and Zame (2007) have shown (by using
different definitions of “non-constructive” devices) that it is not possible to explicitly describe any social
welfare order satisfying the Anonymity and Strong Pareto axioms.
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use of the Svensson topology yields a positive answer.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let R and N be the sets of real numbers and natural numbers respectively. Let Y , a non-
empty subset of R, be the set of all possible utilities that any generation can achieve. Then
X ≡ YN is the set of all possible utility streams. If x ∈ X , then x = (x1,x2,⋯), where, for
all n ∈N, xn ∈Y represents the amount of utility that the generation of period n earns. The
sequence (0,0,0,⋯) ∈ X is denoted by 0, and the sequence (1,1,1,⋯) is denoted by e.
If Y has only one element, then X is a singleton, and the problem of ranking or evalu-
ating infinite utility streams is trivial. Thus, without further mention, the set Y will always
be assumed to have at least two distinct elements. For all y,z ∈ X , we write y ≥ z if yn ≥ zn,
for all n ∈N, we write y > z if y ≥ z and y ≠ z, and we write y≫ z if yi > zi for all i ∈N.
For x ∈X , and N ∈N, we denote (x1,⋯,xN) by x(N) and (xN+1,xN+2,⋯) by x[N]. Thus,
given any x ∈ X and N ∈N, we can write x = (x(N),x[N]). If x,y ∈ X , and N ∈N, we write
z = (x(N),y) to denote the element z ∈X , satisfying zk = xk for all k ∈ {1,⋯,N} and zN+k = yk
for all k ∈N.








xn, and the sum of the truncated sequence




xn. The unit simplex in
X is the set Sim = {x ∈ X ∶ S(x) = 1}. For x,y ∈ X , we will denote (∣x1−y1∣, ∣x2−y2∣,⋯) ∈RN+
by ∣x−y∣.
2.2 Social Welfare Relations
A social welfare relation (SWR), interchangeably called a preference relation on X , is a
binary relation ≽ on X which is reflexive (i.e., x ≽ x for any x ∈ X) and transitive (i.e., for
any x,y,z ∈X , x ≽ y and y ≽ z imply that x ≽ z holds). Given a preference relation ≽ on X , we
indicate its asymmetric and symmetric parts by ≻ and ∼. Recall that for any x,y ∈ X , x ≻ y
means x ≽ y and not y ≽ x, and x ∼ y is defined as x ≽ y and y ≽ x.
For the SWR ≽ on X , for each x ∈ X , we define the lower contour set LC(x) and upper
contour set UC(x) as
LC(x) = {y ∈ X ∶ x ≽ y}; and UC(x) = {y ∈ X ∶ x ≼ y},
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respectively. We say that a SWR ≽ on a topological space (X ;τ) is lower (respectively
upper) semicontinuous if LC(x) (respectively UC(x)), is a closed subset of X for every
x ∈ X . Also it is continuous if it is both upper and lower semicontinuous.
A social welfare order (SWO), interchangeably called a preference order on X , is a
binary relation ≽ on X which is complete (i.e., if for any x,y ∈ X either x ≽ y or y ≽ x holds)
and transitive. The social welfare order is representable (by a utility function) if there is
some u ∶ X →R such that for any x,y ∈ X , we have
x ≽ y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y).
We refer to this representation as social welfare function (SWF).
While it is obviously not possible to associate an incomplete social welfare relation ≽
a SWF, we may nevertheless find a function v ∶ X →R such that
x ≽ y⇒ v(x) ≥ v(y) , and x ≻ y⇒ v(x) > v(y).
We say that v is a Richter-Peleg representation (RPR) of the SWR ≽ on X . If the SWR ≽
has an RPR v then, and only then, ≽ can be extended to a SWO represented by the SWF
v.3 However this generalized formulation of utility representation has the shortcoming
that it is unable to capture the indecisiveness region of the SWR: when v(x) > v(y) all we
can deduce is that either x ≻ y or x and y are unrelated by ≽. This is the price to pay for
dispensing with completeness while using a notion of ‘utility function’.
Nevertheless we may still allow for incompleteness of a SWR and represent it by a
set of functions without any information loss. The SWR ≽ on X admits a multi-utility
representation if there exists a family V of functions v ∶ X →R such that
x ≽ y⇔ [v(x) ≥ v(y) for all v ∈V ] .
This notion is of universal nature, because Evren and Ok (2011, Proposition 1) prove that
any preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive binary relation) has a trivial multi-utility repre-
sentation. Alcantud et al. (2015, Remark 2.7) prove that for any preorder, the existence of
a multi-utility representation with the set of utilities being countably infinite implies the
existence of a Richter-Peleg representation.
2.3 The Efficiency conditions
We refer to the following efficiency conditions on the social welfare relations.
Definition 1. Strong Pareto (SP) : If x,y ∈ X and x > y, then x ≻ y.
Definition 2. Weak Pareto (WP) : If x,y ∈ X and x ≫ y, then x ≻ y.
3The binary relation R is an extension of ≽ when ≽ is a subset of R and ≻ is a subset of the asymmetric
part of R.
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2.4 The No Impatience conditions
Given x ∈ X , and M,N ∈N, we denote by x(M,N) the sequence x′ ∈ X defined by,
x′M = xN , x
′
N = xM and x
′
n = xn, ∀n ≠N,M. (1)
Observe that the definition of a new sequence x(M,N) in (1) from some x ∈ X involves
swapping one-period utilities corresponding to periods M and N, ceteris paribus.
With respect to equity we refer to the Anonymity axiom4 as follows:
Definition 3. Anonymity (AN): A finite permutation of a utility stream produces a utility
stream with the same social utility, i.e., for all x ∈ X and M,N ∈N, x ∼ x(M,N).
When this axiom is in conflict with other properties, one may at least try to impose
weaker equity axioms. We investigate the case of no impatience. In order to define the
pertinent concepts, let us first say that a social welfare relation ≽ exhibits impatience at
x ∈ X , if there exist M, N ∈N with M >N such that either
(i) xM > xN and x(M,N) ≻ x; or (ii) xM < xN and x ≻ x(M,N). (2)
The impatience condition captures the intuition that the preference relation ≽ exhibits
a preference towards “immediate gratification”.
We provide two alternative definitions of lack of impatience (or no impatience) as
below. They relax AN in the following terms:
Definition 4. No Impatience (weak) axiom (NIw): A social welfare relation ≽ is said to
exhibit weak no impatience on X if for each x ∈X and any M, N ∈N with M >N, whenever
xM > xN we have that x(M,N) ≻ x is false, and xM < xN implies x(M,N) ≺ x is false.
This definition does not require x(M,N) and x to be comparable. However, if x(M,N)
and x are comparable, then
x(M,N) ≼ x in case xM > xN and x(M,N) ≽ x if xM < xN .
Definition 5. No Impatience (strong) axiom (NIs): A social welfare relation ≽ is said to
exhibit strong no impatience on X if for each x ∈X and any M, N ∈N with M >N, whenever
xM > xN we have x(M,N) ≼ x, and xM < xN implies x(M,N) ≽ x.
The weak no impatience axiom described in Definition 4 is weaker than the strong no
impatience axiom in Definition 5. Proposition 1 below ensures that they are different. They
coincide for preference orders, although Banerjee and Dubey (2014, Section 4) proves that
even when we have Strongly Paretian preference orders, they do not imply AN.
4The concept of Anonymity was introduced in the social welfare literature by Diamond (1965) who
described it as “equal treatment” of all generations (present and future).
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2.5 Metric functions
The following metrics are used to examine continuity properties of the social welfare re-
lations in induced topologies.



















1, if xn ≠ yn
0, otherwise.
(5)






The following properties are satisfied by Svensson, sup and product metrics.5
(M.1) If x,y ∈ X , then d(x,y) = d(∣x−y∣,0).
(M.2) If x,y ∈ X be such that x ≥ y then d(x,0) ≥ d(y,0).
(M.3) If x ∈ X and M ∈N, then d((0(M),x),0) ≤ d(x,0).
(M.4) If λn ∈ [0,1] for all n ∈N, and limn→∞ λn → 0, then limn→∞ d(λn(e(M),0[M]),0) = 0 for
every M ∈N.
We denote the set of metric functions satisfying (M.1)-(M.4) by ∆. The Campbell metric
meets (M.1)-(M.3) but violates (M.4) whenever it is meaningful, because d(λ(e(M),0[M]),0)=
1 for every M ∈N and λ > 0. Using metric d ∈ ∆, function f ∶ X →R+ defined as
f (x) ≡ d(x,0) for all x ∈ X
5Readers are referred to Banerjee and Mitra (2008) for a detailed description of these properties. Observe
that (M.4) is meaningful only in certain cases, e.g., when [0,ε) ⊆Y for some ε > 0.
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(see Banerjee and Mitra (2008) for details) satisfies the sub-additivity property:
For any x,y ∈ X , with x+y ∈ X , f (x+y) ≤ f (x)+ f (y) holds. (7)
Finally, for any metric d we define the distance between a point x̄ ∈ X and a set A ⊂ X as
d(x̄,A) = inf
x∈A d(x, x̄).
3 Multi-utility and Richter-Peleg representations
Banerjee and Dubey (2010) ask whether one can define ethical (i.e., satisfying SP and AN)
SWRs that can be represented by not just a single utility function but possibly many utility
functions. However such attempt to avoid the impossibility result in Basu and Mitra (2003)
failed to yield a positive response. Furthermore, their negative result for the representation
of the social welfare orders persists even if anonymity is replaced by no impatience con-
ditions. Banerjee and Mitra (2007, Theorem 1) proves that every social welfare function
satisfying SP displays impatience at uncountably many utility streams on every non-trivial
X . Banerjee and Dubey (2013, Theorem 1) show that the conclusion remains valid when
SP is replaced by WP for X =YN, if Y contains subsets of order type similar to the set of
negative and positive integers. This implies that every social welfare function satisfying
WP must violate NIw (or NIs) on these domains. With this in view, we explore the possi-
bility of nontrivial multi-utility representation of the social welfare relations satisfying SP
and NIw (or NIs). We obtain very different conclusions depending on the version of the
no-impatience postulate that we adopt.
3.1 No Impatience as NIw
We proceed to show that the situation is quite different if AN is relaxed to NIw. Proposition
1 below proves that if one weakens AN to no impatience as NIw (Definition 4), then
instead of the negative results in Banerjee and Dubey (2010, Proposition 1, Theorem 2), a
possibility result arises. Therefore continuity with respect to relevant topologies could be
checked for. In fact we show that continuity with respect to the product topology can be
imposed too. This ensures continuity with respect to the relevant topologies overviewed
by Lauwers (1997) in his analysis of the extension to the infinite population case of the
topological approach to social choice theory.
Proposition 1. For each X =YN with ∅ ≠Y ⊆R, there exist SWRs ≽ on X that satisfy SP
and NIw (but not NIs). Further the SWRs have both multi-utility representations continu-
ous with respect to the product topology (with the set of utilities being countably infinite),
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and Richter-Peleg representations6. Consequently, such SWRs are continuous with respect
to the product topology.
Proof. Let V = {vk ∶ k ∈N} be the countable family of functions with vk ∶ X →R given by
vk(x) =∑
k
i=1 ixi. Define for any x,y ∈ X :
x ≽ y if and only if vk(x) ⩾ vk(y) for all k ∈N.
This produces a SWR on X that verifies SP and by construction, ≽ has a multi-utility
representation V with the set of utilities being countably infinite. Because vk is a projection
and these are continuous and open with respect to the product topology (cf., Willard (1970,
Theorem 8.6)), vk is continuous with respect to the product topology too. Let us check that
≽ verifies NIw.
For each x ∈ X and M,N ∈N with M >N, suppose xM > xN (resp. xN > xM). Irrespective
of the case,
vk(x)−vk(x(M,N)) = (M−N)(xM −xN) if k >M.
We claim that x(M,N) ≽ x (respectively, x ≽ x(M,N)) is false. To prove it we only need
to observe that vk(x(M,N)) ⩾ vk(x) (respectively vk(x(M,N)) ⩽ vk(x)), is false when k >
M. In order to prove that ≽ has Richter-Peleg representations we use the aforementioned
Alcantud et al. (2015, Remark 2.7). Finally, to prove that ≽ does not verify NIs, we
consider x = (0,1,0con) and M = 2, N = 1, then xM > xN but x(M,N) = (1,0con) ≼ x is false
because v1(x(M,N)) = 1 ⩽ 0 = v1(x) is false.
Since X is first countable in the product topology, it is not difficult to prove continuity
of ≽ from the fact that each vk is continuous with respect to the product topology.
3.2 No impatience as NIs
In this subsection we show that the alternative definition NIs does not lead to positive
results as described in Proposition 1 above. For this we first establish that the social
welfare relation ≽P satisfying SP and NIs does not admit a Richter-Peleg representation
for every non-trivial domains X .
Proposition 2. Assume that Y contains two distinct elements. There does not exist a social
welfare relation ≽ satisfying SP and NIs that has a Richter-Peleg representation.
6Using Alcantud et al. (2015, Proposition 2.5), we can infer that the SWR ≽ also admits countable
continuous strong multi-utility representation. A social welfare relation ≽ on X has a strong multi-utility
representation if there exists a multi-utility representation V such that x ≻ y⇔ [v(x) > v(y) for all v ∈V ].
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We assume that Y contains 0 and 1 for ease of
exposition, instead of a,b ∈Y with a < b. Let ≽P be a SWR satisfying SP and NIs with its
asymmetric and symmetric parts ≻P and ∼P respectively.
Let v ∶ X →R be a RPR of this SWR. We use this v to construct the following SWO:
For all x,y ∈ X , we define ⪰ as
x ⪰ y if and only if v(x) ≥ v(y).
We show that the representable SWO ⪰ satisfies SP and NIs.
(a) SP: For any x,y ∈ X satisfying x > y, using SP we get x ≻P y. By the RPR of the SWR,
we must then have v(x) > v(y). Using the definition of ⪰, it implies that x ≻ y.
(b) NIs: Without loss of generality, let us assume that for any x ∈ X and M,N ∈ N with
M > N, we have xM > xN . Then by NIs, we have x(M,N) ≼P x and using the RPR
v(x(M,N)) ≤ v(x). In other words, v(x(M,N)) > v(x) and x(M,N) ≻P x, must be false.
Thus v(x(M,N)) ≤ v(x) or x(M,N) ⪯ x.
Thus, we have established ⪰ to be a SWO satisfying SP and NIs. Also the RPR v is a
representation of ⪰.
While describing NIs, the utility sequence x ∈ X was chosen arbitrarily. Hence, we
have proved existence of the representation v ∶ X →R satisfying SP which does not violate
NIs for any x ∈ X .
This contradicts a result in Banerjee and Mitra (2007, Theorem 1) where it has been
proved that every representation v ∶ X →R of the SWO satisfying SP must violate the NIs
at uncountably many x ∈ X where none of these x ∈ X are constant utility streams. The
contradiction completes the proof of the Proposition.
We use the aforementioned Alcantud et al. (2015, Remark 2.7) to prove that ≽P satis-
fying SP and NIs cannot have a multi-utility representation with the set of utilities being
countably infinite and thereby establish our claim in the beginning of this sub-section.
Remark 1. Propositions 1 and 2 together immediately suggest: Does there exist a social
welfare relation satisfying SP and NIs that has a multi-utility representation continuous
with respect to the product topology? This would help to clarify the possible distinction
between existence of non-trivial multi-utility representations and Richter-Peleg represen-
tations in the analysis of infinite utility streams. We address this issue later on in Section
4.
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4 Continuity properties of the Social Welfare Relations
We can draw another consequence from Proposition 1. Banerjee and Dubey (2014, The-
orem 2), shows that the existence of a SWO satisfying SP and NIs involves use of non-
constructive techniques. This is also true if SP is relaxed to the infinite Pareto 7. Proposi-
tion 1 shows that their conclusion crucially hinges on completeness in the sense that if we
dispense with completeness, then one can explicitly define SWRs that satisfy SP and NIw
without the appeal to the Axiom of Choice. As shown in the Proposition 1, these SWRs
have the additional useful property of being continuous in product topology.
In this section we examine the continuity properties of the SWRs satisfying SP and
NIs, as well as implications regarding their representability by multi-utilities. Observe
that NIs is more restrictive compared to NIw, as it requires x(M,N) to be comparable to
x. This difference could be important because the introduction of the additional compa-
rability requirements on ≿ (making it more complete than the SWR ≽) sometimes causes
incompatibilities in the intergenerational analysis.
On the positive side, we note that an example in Banerjee and Dubey (2014, Section
4) provides an explicit description of SWR ≿ satisfying SP and NIs.8 Even though it uses
the family of functions vk ∶ X → R similar to those used in Proposition 1, the following
example shows that the two SWRs are distinct.




















and y = (0,1,0,1,0,1,0,⋯). Then x ≽ y because for each even k, vk(x)−vk(y) = 0 and for
each odd k, vk(x)−vk(y) = 1k . However neither x ≻ y nor x ∼ y hold true.
It is important to note that the SWR ≿ determines the ranking of any pair of utilities by
only looking at the tail of the family of functions vk(⋅), or in other words, it must ignore
the initial vk(⋅) of finite length.
Henceforth we assume that X = [0,1]N. This domain permits to make continuities and
related properties meaningful.
7Infinite Pareto is defined as follows: For x, y ∈ X , if x > y, and xi > yi for infinitely many i ∈N, then x ≻ y.
8Using the countable family of functions, vk ∶ X →R, given by vk(x) =∑ki=1 ixi, it defines
x ≻ y if and only if ∃N such that vk(x) > vk(y) ∀k ≥N,
and
x ∼ y if and only if ∃N such that vk(x) = vk(y) ∀k ≥N,
and let x ≿ y if and only if x ≻ y or x ∼ y.
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4.1 WP and NIs axioms
In this subsection we explore the possibility of combining WP and NIs for lower semi-
continuous social welfare relations.
4.1.1 Sup Topology
In the next result we show that the SWR satisfying WP and NIs does not satisfy continuity
in the sup topology.
Proposition 3. There does not exist a social welfare relation satisfying WP, NIs and lower
semi - continuity in the sup topology.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We assume that there exists a SWR ≽ satisfying WP,
































for all n ∈ N. For p ∈ N, let r(p) denote the first non-zero remainder of the successive
divisions of p by 4, and q(p) the number of divisions with a zero remainder [For example,



















) for n ∈N,
where p runs from 1 to 4n−1, and the term 4p4n+1 is repeated q(4p) times if r(4p) = 1, and
q(4p)+1 times otherwise. Note that
(a) every element of ū(n) is contained in u(n+1) for all n ∈N,
(b) u′(2) is obtained by postponing elements of u(1) and preponing higher elements avail-
able in u(2) to the corresponding positions in ū(1),
(c) for all n > 1, u′(n+1) is obtained in two steps:
Step 1 Postpone elements of u′(n) and prepone higher elements available in u(n+1)
to the corresponding positions in ū(n). This gives u′′(n+1) which contains
repeated elements, which are not placed at consecutive locations.
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Step 2 We postpone each of the repeated elements, occurring at the first instance, and
prepone higher elements so that the repeated elements are placed at consecu-
tive locations to obtain u′(n+1)9.
Consider the utility streams10
x0 = (u(1),u(2),⋯), y = (ū(1), ū(2),⋯), and
xn = (ū(1),⋯, ū(n),u′(n+1),u(n+2),⋯) for all n ∈N.
Observe that the utility stream xn is obtained from xn−1 by preponing finitely many higher
utilities from future dates to earlier dates. Since the social welfare order satisfies NIs, we
get x1 ≼ x0 and xn ≼ xn−1 for all n ∈N. Also,11
[sup
t∈N






for all n ∈N]→ lim
n→∞ x
n = y.
Since SWR ≽ satisfies lower semi-continuity in sup topology, we get y ≼ x0. However,
yt > x0t for all t ∈N which leads to y≻ x0 by WP. This contradiction completes the proof.
4.1.2 Campbell Topology
Subsequent to the positive results on continuity in Svensson (1980), the continuity of eth-
ical social welfare relations attracted wide attention. In one early contribution, Campbell
(1985) proposed a topology (since named as Campbell topology) and showed that with
reference to it, the impossibility results of Diamond (1965) persist. In the following propo-
sition we examine the continuity of SWRs satisfying NIs and WP in Campbell’s topology.
Proposition 4. There does not exist a social welfare relation satisfying WP, NIs and lower
semi-continuity in the Campbell topology.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We assume that there exists a SWR ≽ satisfying WP,













































42 ), each of the 4
th, 8th and
12th elements is the same as its immediate predecessor. The third and fourth elements of u′(2) are postponed
to become 12th and 16th elements of u′′(3) in Step 1. In Step 2, the 12th element of u′′(3) is postponed to
become the 15th element of u′(3).
10Similar utility streams have been used in Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, p. 796) and Basu and Mitra
(2007, Theorem 4).
11For example, for x1, sup
t∈N
∣x1t −yt ∣ = 142 +
1
43 which is attained at t = 6,10,14.
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,x[n+1]) for all n ∈N.
Observe that the utility stream xn is obtained from xn−1 by swapping one higher utility (the
(n+1)-th term with value 1− 12n+1 ) with an earlier lower utility (the n-th term with value
1
2 ).
Since the social welfare order satisfies NIs, we get x1 ≼ x and xn ≼ xn−1 for all n = 2,3,⋯.




























for all n ∈N
which means that {xn}n∈N converges to y in the Campbell topology. Since ≽ satisfies lower
semi-continuity we get x ≽ y. However, y ≫ x leads to y ≻ x by WP. This contradiction
completes the proof.
4.2 Topology for continuous Social Welfare Relations
Having encountered impossibility of social welfare relations satisfying NIs and WP (which
also implies similar outcome in case we use stronger efficiency notion of SP) in sup topol-
ogy or Campbell topology, we explore the topology under which continuity can be re-
stored. For the SWRs satisfying AN and SP, Banerjee and Mitra (2008) have obtained
necessary and sufficient conditions which a topology should satisfy to ensure lower semi-
continuity. The required condition is that the distance from the origin to the unit simplex
in the space of utility streams be positive. In this subsection we intend to examine if their
arguments are applicable for SWRs satisfying NIs and SP.
Proposition 5 establishes a necessary condition for the lower semicontinuity of the
SWR satisfying NIs and SP. The proof closely follows the argument in Banerjee and Mitra
(2008, Proposition 1).
Proposition 5. There does not exist a social welfare relation satisfying SP, NIs and lower
semicontinuity for metric d ∈ ∆ if d(0,Sim) = 0.
Proof. By contradiction. We assume that there exists a SWR ≽ satisfying SP, NIs and
lower semicontinuity in the topology induced by d ∈ ∆ although d(0,Sim) = 0. Then there
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exists a sequence {zN}∞N=1, zN ∈ Sim for all N ∈ N and d(zN ,0)→ 0 as N →∞. For each
N ∈N, using the fact that S(zN) = 1, we can choose k(N), the minimum integer such that









Denote a(N) = S(zN(k(N))) and define the vector y(N) = (y1(N),y2(N),⋯,yk(N)(N)) as
follows:















Observe that ∣ym+1(N)− ym(N)∣ = zNm for all m = 1,2,⋯,k(N)−1 holds. Define x ∈ X and
x̄ ∈ X as below:
x = (0,y(1),0,y(2),0,y(3),⋯) , and
x̄ = (1,y(1),0,y(2),0,y(3),⋯) .
We then define a utility stream xN for each N ∈N using the utility stream x in two steps.
Step 1 We interchange the element y1(N) in the first position of y(N) and the first element
x1 = 0. After this interchange, y(N) is transformed into a new sequence (renamed
as y′(N))
y′(N) = (0,y2(N),⋯,yk(N)(N)) .
Step 2 Next, beginning with second element of y′(N), each element of y′(N) is preponed
by one period to obtain y′′(N) = (y2(N),⋯,yk(N)(N),0) and
xN = (a(N),y(1),0,y(2),0,⋯,0,y(N −1),0,y2(N),⋯,yk(N)(N),0,0,y(N +1),0,y(N +2),0,⋯) .
Observe that in each of the two steps, we have preponed higher utility to an earlier period
and there are finitely many substitutions for each xN . Since ≽ satisfies NIs, x ≽ xN must
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hold true for each N ∈N. Also for each N ∈N,










































the first line in (8) following from (M.1), the second line from (7), the third line from




N , x̄)→ 0. (9)
Since xN ∈ LC(x) for all N ∈N, (9) implies that x̄ ∈ LC(x), by lower semi-continuity. How-
ever, x̄1 = 1 > 0 = x1 and x̄ ≥ x lead to x̄ ≻ x by SP. This contradiction completes the proof of
the Proposition.
Remark 2. Both the product and the sup metrics satisfy the condition d(0,Sim) = 0 (cf.,
Banerjee and Mitra (2008, p. 6)). Hence, Proposition 5 implies that no social welfare
relation, satisfying SP, NIs, and lower semi-continuity with respect to the sup topology,
exists. This is already implied by Proposition 3.
Banerjee and Mitra (2008, Proposition 2) establish that for any metric d ∈ ∆ satisfying
the condition d(0,Sim) > 0, there exists a social welfare order on X = [0,1]N that verifies
the SP, AN and continuity. Of course, such consequence continues to hold when the AN is
weakened to NIs. Combining this fact and Proposition 5, the following theorem obtains.
Theorem 1. Let us select d ∈ ∆, and denote by τd the topology induced by d. Then, there
are social welfare relations satisfying SP, NIs, and lower semicontinuity in the τd topology
if and only if d(0,Sim) > 0. In this case, there are social welfare orders satisfying SP, NIs,
and lower semicontinuity in the τd topology.
If we now invoke Banerjee and Mitra (2008, Lemma 2), which proves that the τd topol-
ogy is larger than the Svensson topology when d ∈ ∆ and d(0,Sim) > 0, we can conclude
as in their Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Among all metrics d ∈ ∆, the Svensson metric induces the smallest topology
under which there exist lower semicontinuous social welfare relations satisfying SP and
NIs.
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4.3 Multi-utilities and continuity
The results in this section have direct implications on the possibility of representing SWRs
by multi-utilities with continuity properties, that we proceed to explore.
It is easy to check that with respect to any topology τ, every SWR that has a τ-
continuous (resp., lower semicontinuous, upper semicontinuous) multi-utility representa-
tion is τ-continuous (resp., lower semicontinuous, upper semicontinuous): cf., Evren and
Ok (2011, p. 556). This natural property permits to solve a question posed in subsection
3.2 in the following terms:
Corollary 2. There exists no social welfare relation satisfying WP and NIs that has multi-
utility representations lower semicontinuous in the Campbell, sup, or product topologies.
Proof. The existence of any such representation implies the existence of SWRs satisfying
WP, NIs, and lower semicontinuity in the Campbell, sup, or product topologies. The first
instance contradicts Proposition 4. The other instances contradict Proposition 3.
In contrast to this negative fact, the recourse to the Svensson topology permits to give
a quite positive answer to the same question:
Corollary 3. There exist social welfare orders satisfying SP and AN (thus NIs) that have
multi-utility representations lower semicontinuous in the Svensson topology.
Proof. Svensson (1980) ensures the existence of a SWO satisfying SP and AN (thus NIs)
that is continuous in the Svensson topology. An appeal to Evren and Ok (2011, Prop. 2)
permits to conclude: it assures that for every lower semicontinuous preorder on a topolog-
ical space, there exist lower semicontinuous multi-utility representations.
Remark 3. We cannot take full advantage of the continuity property of the SWO in the
argument above, because it is not always true that continuous orders have continuous
multi-utility representations: cf., Evren and Ok (2011, subsection 3.1). In fact we do not yet
know if there are SP and NIs social welfare relations that have multi-utility representations
continuous in the Svensson topology. Nevertheless, our results in subsection 3.2 prove that
any such possible representation should consist of uncountably many utilities.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we explore the implications of imposing completeness on efficient social
welfare relations that do not display impatience.
If completeness is insisted upon, both SP as well as its weaker version WP are incon-
sistent with no impatience in the case of lower semi-continuous (with respect to sup or
Campbell topology) social welfare relations. In addition, among a certain class of met-
ric topologies, the Svensson topology is the smallest topology for which completeness is
compatible with continuous social welfare relations not exhibiting any impatience and that
are sensitive to the interests of any single generation.
However, if we dispense with completeness then we have a more involved situation.
In order to discuss its implications under no impatience, we refer to two kinds of repre-
sentability properties, namely, multi-utility representations –which always exist and thus
are only useful if they verify additional requirements– and Richter-Peleg representations.
Assume the SP axiom. Then a suitable form of the no impatience principle (NIw) is consis-
tent with explicitly defined social welfare relations admitting multi-utility representations
with the set of utilities being countably infinite (thereby admitting Richter-Peleg repre-
sentations) which are continuous even in the product topology. Despite this, we conclude
that in the context of evaluating infinite utility streams, the problems of finding potentially
useful multi-utility representations and Richter-Peleg representation are significantly dif-
ferent. This comes from a comparison between Corollary 3 and Proposition 2: a stronger
form of the no impatience principle (NIs) is inconsistent with Richter-Peleg representa-
tions but permits meaningful multi-utility representations (because we can impose that
the utilities incorporate lower semi-continuity in the Svensson’s topology). This confirms
that for no impatient and incomplete relations, the property of having a Richter-Peleg rep-
resentation seems to be more demanding than the non-trivial property of having lower
semi-continuous multi-utility representations.
These results contribute to demonstrate that insistence on the completeness axiom
should require careful consideration.
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